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THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
THROUGH SHRINK-WRAP LICENSE AGREEMENTS
The protection of computer software' from piracy is a primary concern
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining computer program). The 1980 Amendments to
the Copyright Act of 1976 define a computer program as a set of instructions used in a
computer to bring about a certain result. Id.; see Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,
480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (computer program is set of instructions that tells
computer how to solve problem), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (1980). In the computer industry the
term computer program is synonymous with computer software. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.
JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 n.l (N.D. Ill. 1979) (in industry computer programs
are known as software), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (1980). Hardware consists of the core computer
and related equipment, while software is the programming that runs the hardware. See Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1979) (defining hardware and
software); J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 22 (1983) (describing components
of computer system). A computer program can exist in a number of different forms, including
the algorithm, the source program, and the object program, and can be represented on various
media. See Bender, Licensing and Protecting Computer Software via Patents and Trade Secrets
in I SOFARE PROTECTION AND MARKETING: COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DATA BASES; VIDEo
GAMES AND MOTION PICTURE.S 619, 625-27 (Practising Law Institute, 1983) (describing various
forms of computer program). Essentially, the computer program is an intangible set of
instructions embodied on a tangible tape or disk. Bender, supra, at 627.
A computer program consists of several stages of development. See Data Cash Sys., Inc.
v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (discussing phases in development
of computer program), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (1980); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing computer operations), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). The first stage consists of the algorithm, which is a flow chart
setting forth the logical steps involved in a program. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group,
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (flow chart sets forth logical steps involved in
solving problem), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (1980); Bender, supra, at 625-26 (algorithm is flow chart
of program). The second stage, the source program, is a translation of the flow chart into a
programming language that the programmer can read and understand. See Data Cash Sys., Inc.
v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (source program is translation
of flow chart into programming language), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (1980); P. HOFFMAN, THE
SoFTWARE LEGAL BOOK 1.3-1 (1985) (program written in programming language is written in
English-like source code). The last stage, the object program, is a translation of the programming
language into machine language that the computer understands directly and which enables the
computer to execute the program. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
1063, 1065 (N.D. Il1. 1979) (last stage is development of object program), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038
(1980); P. HoFFmAN, supra, at 1.3-1 (object code program consists of machine language
instructions that cause computer to do useful work); J. HUmE & R. HOLT, UCSD PASCAL: A
BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO PROGRAMMING MICROCOMPUTERS 1 (1982) (computer can execute instruc-
tions in machine language that computer understands directly). The computer must translate
the source program into the object program before it can execute the program. See J. HUME &
R. HOLT, supra, at I (computer must translate instructions written in programming language
and compile a program in machine language from the source program to execute instructions).
There are basically two types of software. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer programs function as either application
programs or operating system programs), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); S. MANDELL,
COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING AND THE LAW 5 (1984) (discussing functions that various types
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of the microcomputer software industry.2 Legal protection of software is
necessary to encourage the innovative development of software.' Traditional
means of protection through copyright, trade secret and patent laws have
of software perform). Application software performs a specific task, such as word processing.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983)
(application programs perform specific task for user, such as word processing), cert. dismissed,
104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1984)
(application software allows system to accomplish particular task). Operating system software
manages the internal functions of the computer or facilitates the use of application software.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983)
(describing functions of application programs and operating system programs), cert. dismissed,
104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
2. See Thou Shalt Not Dupe, Computerworld, Jan. 28, 1985, at ID/l-ID/2 (discussing
microcomputer software industry's severe copying problem) [hereinafter cited as Thou Shalt
Not Dupe]; The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations' (ADAPSO) Software
Protection Program (1984) (addressing critical problem of unauthorized copying of microcom-
puter software) (available in Washington and Lee Law Review Office) [hereinafter cited as
Software Protection Program]; Brooks, Computer Programs and Data Bases-Acquisition of
Rights by Vendors from Independent Developers and Users from Custom Designers in 2
SOFTWARE PROTECTION AND MARKETING: COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DATA BASES; VIDEO GAMES
AND MOTION PICTURES 7, 18 (Practising Law Institute, 1983) (software misappropriation is
major computer industry problem, especially in personal and small business computer market).
The microcomputer software industry is attempting to reduce the problem of illegal copying.
See Thou Shalt Not Dupe, supra, at ID/1. For example, the Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations (ADAPSO), a trade association representing the computer software and
service industry, has embarked on a software protection program involving hardware-based
protection devices, a public awareness campaign, and strict enforcement of software rights
through lawsuits. See Software Protection Program, supra, at 1 (describing campaign against
software piracy).
The unauthorized use of software presents real dangers for the microcomputer industry.
See ADAPSO Software Protection Committee, Software Authorization Overview 3 (Dec. 21,
1984) (exposure draft-for review and discussion purposes only) (discussing effects of illegal
copying on industry) (available in Washington and Lee University Law Review Office) [herein-
after cited as Software Overview]. A recent survey by Future Computing, Inc., a leading
information services firm, indicates that the problem of illegal software copying is severe. See
Future Computing, Inc., News Release (Jan. 17, 1985) (survey on piracy of business software
for personal computers) (available in Washington and Lee University Law Review Office)
[hereinafter cited as Future Computing]. The Future Computing survey indicated that approxi-
mately 50% of existing software in the personal computer marketplace is pirated. Id. at 1.
Furthermore, the survey estimated that piracy cost the business software industry $1.3 billion
in lost revenues between 1981 and 1984. Id. at 2.
3. See 5 N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD 19
(1980) (legal as well as physical protection of information is necessary incentive to creation and
dissemination of information); J. SOMA, supra note 1, at 21 (providing viable method for
protection of software will foster commercial development of software); Brooks, supra note 2,
at 56 (software needs protection to foster goals of innovation and widespread availability). Lost
revenues from software piracy decrease the incentive to invest in software development and,
therefore, deter software vendors from developing new products. See Software Overview, supra
note 2, at 4. As a result, legitimate users pay for illegal copying through higher prices, decreased
service support and a lack of new and improved software products. See id. Software piracy
thus harms users as well as the microcomputer software industry.
1348 [Vol. 42:1347
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failed to provide sufficient protection of proprietary interests in software. 4
Software developers, consequently, rely on the use of contracts, in the form
of license agreements, as a means to protect software from unauthorized use
and copying.5 By granting a license to the purchaser to use the software,
rather than selling the program outright, the software developer is able to
retain ownership and control over his product. 6 Through license agreements
the software developer limits the user's rights to copy, transfer, modify and
In 1974 Congress created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy-
rights Works (CONTU) to develop a national policy for protecting the rights of copyright
owners to software and assuring public access to computer programs. See Pub. L. No. 93-573,
88 Stat. 1873-75 (1974) (creating the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works); see also N. HENRY, supra, at 4 (purpose of CONTU was to assist President
and Congress in developing national policy for protecting rights of copyright owners and
assuring public access to copyrighted works when used in computer systems). A major problem
in protecting computer programs is that users can readily and inexpensively copy programs. See
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983) (cost
of developing computer programs is far greater than cost of duplication), cert. dismissed, 104
S. Ct. 690 (1984); Brooks, supra note 2, at 9-10 (users can appropriate computer programs
readily and inexpensively). The cost differential between buying a legitimate copy of a software
product and making an illegal copy often is hundreds of dollars. See Thou Shalt Not Dupe,
supra note 2, at ID/2 (discussing problem of software piracy). In determining the proper
amount of protection for software, one must balance the interest in providing adequate
compensation to insure the development of software with the interest in the free exchange of
ideas in the marketplace. See J. SOMA, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing need for adequate
compensation for investment as well as need for free exchange of ideas).
4. See J. SoMA, supra note 1, at 24 (traditional means of protecting software are
inadequate); Davidson, "Box-Top" Software Licenses, 41 BENCH & BAR OF MINNESOTA 9, 9
(1984) (existing bodies of law do not protect software publishers' interests adequately). The
legal system has not kept pace with technological developments in software. See J. SoMA, supra
note 1, at 21 (discussing need to adapt traditional law to computer technology). No definitive
legal principles have emerged concerning the protection of software. See id. (discussing need
for legal mechanism to provide viable method of protecting software). Consequently, uncertainty
exists concerning the appropriate legal mechanism for protecting the proprietary interests of
software developers. See S. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 124-36 (discussing appropriateness of
alternative means of protection for software); infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing inadequacies and uncertainties surrounding copyright, trade secret and patent protection
of software). Future Computing, Inc.'s recent survey on software piracy evidences the failure
of traditional means of protection. See Future Computing, supra note 2 (discussing survey on
piracy of business software for personal computers).
5. See S. MANDELL, supra note I, at 6 (software developers usually license copy of
program to user to protect proprietary rights and to prevent unauthorized use or copying); J.
SoMA, supra note 1, at 91 (software vendors commonly use license agreements in mass market
to protect software); Bender, supra note 1, at 633 (licensing is most common vehicle for
acquiring rights in software).
6. See S. MANDELL, supra note I, at 7-8 (license allows use of program with strict
restrictions on number of copies user may make and use). The purpose of a license agreement
is to prevent the unauthorized exploitation of the product. See S&H Computer Sys. v. SAS
Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 421 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (examining underlying policies of license
agreements); S. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 131 (licensing provisions strictly control scope of
use by licensee).
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use the software 7 and thereby gains greater protection than traditional
methods of legal protection provide.
8
In the microcomputer industry, software developers commonly distribute
software pursuant to shrink-wrap license agreements. 9 The shrink-wrap li-
cense provides that a user who breaks the seal of the software's cellophane
package or uses the program is bound by the terms and conditions of the
license agreement included in the package with the software.' 0 Under a
shrink-wrap license arrangement, therefore, the user's act of opening the
software package allegedly constitutes the user's acceptance of the terms of
the license." The courts generally have upheld software license agreements
as legally effective means of protecting a program developer's intellectual
property rights in software. ' 2 To date, however, the courts have not addressed
7. See S&H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 421 (M.D. Tenn. 1983)
(express terms of license agreement govern access to product); infra notes 63-72 and accompa-
nying text (discussing terms of license agreements); see also appendix attached (standard license
agreement).
8. See infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of traditional
means of software protection). Compare infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text (discussing
inadequacies of traditional protections) with infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (discussing
protection provided by use of license agreements).
9. See Davidson, supra note 4, at 9 (most sales of packaged software involve use of
shrink-wrap license agreements); Brooks, Shrink- Wrapped License Agreements: Do They Prevent
the Existence of a "First Sale"?, 1 THE COMPUTER LAWYER No. 3, at 17 (April, 1984) (shrink-
wrap program licenses are common in the computer industry) [hereinafter cited as First Sale].
Other names for the shrink-wrap license include "tear me open" license, "box-top" license,
"self-executing" license and "blister-pack" license. See Davidson, supra note 4, at 9 (most sales
of packaged software now include "box-top" or "tear me open" license agreements); Raysman
& Brown, 'Shrink-Wrap' License Agreements, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (other
descriptive phrases for shrink-wrap license include "tear-open license" and "blister-pack li-
cense"); Reynolds, The Self-Executing License: A Legal Fiction, 2 COMPUTER LAW REPORTER
No. 4, at 549 (1984) (software vendors include "self-executing" or "tear-open" license in
software packaging). Under current practice, each software package contains a computer
program on a diskette together with a license agreement. See Raysman & Brown, supra, at 2
(discussing current practice of distributing software pursuant to shrink-wrap license agreements).
In microcomputer markets, disks containing computer programs along with documentation are
available over the counter and generally come in box-like shrink-wrapped (cellophane) packages.
First Sale, supra, at 18. Documentation includes written explanations of the construction of the
program, what the program does, and how to use the program. See P. HoJrs1MN, supra note
1, at 1.4-1 (describing documentation for computer programs).
10. See First Sale, supra note 9, at 18-19 (discussing use of shrink-wrap licenses in
microcomputer industry); Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing current practice of
distributing software pursuant to shrink-wrap license agreements); Reynolds, supra note 9, at
549 (analyzing nature of shrink-wrap license agreement); see also attached appendix (standard
shrink-wrap license agreement); infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (discussing terms of
shrink-wrap licenses).
11. See First Sale, supra note 9, at 19 (discussing unilateral nature of most microcomputer
software licenses); Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing concept of acceptance by
user's action); Reynolds, supra note 9, at 549 (analyzing user's act of opening software package
as acceptance); see also infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (analyzing validity of shrink-
wrap license as contract).
12. See Allen v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 154, 158, 161 (E.D.
1350 [Vol. 42:1347
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the issue of whether the shrink-wrap license agreement creates a valid contract
that binds the user to the license terms. 3 In determining the validity of the
shrink-wrap license agreement, the courts must balance the software propri-
etor's interest in protecting the intellectual property rights in software with
Mo. 1984) (upholding limitation of liability clause in software license agreement); D'Antuono
v. CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.R.I. 1983) (enforcing forum selection
clause in program license agreement); S&H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp.
416, 421, 423-24 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (granting partial summary judgment for breach of contract
claims pursuant to software license agreement); Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-
3077-F, slip op. at _...._(D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases
file) (upholding warranty disclaimer provisions in software agreement); Hi Neighbor Enter.,
Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823, 827 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that provisions of
software license agreement were enforceable).
13. See M. SCOTT, COMPUTER LAW § 6.31, at 6-28 (1984) (no reported cases exist to date
on legal enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses); Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2 (there
are apparently no reported judicial decisions evaluating the legal effectiveness of shrink-wrap
licenses). In 1983, in Micropro Int'l Corp. v. United Computer Corp., Micropro International
Corp. (Micropro) brought suit against United Computer Corp. (United) in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California for breach of a shrink-wrap license
agreement. Complaint for Micropro Int'l Corp. v. United Computer Corp., printed in COMPUTER
LITIGATION 1984: RESOLVING COMPUTER RELATED DisPUTEs AND PROTECTING PROPRIETARY
RiGHTS 377 (Practising Law Institute, 1984). The complaint in Micropro alleged copyright
infringement, breach of copyright license, and unfair competition. Id. at 383-89. Micropro
marketed computer programs for use on personal computers and distributed all of its software
products to end users pursuant to shrink-wrap license agreements. Id. at 379-80. Micropro
alleged that United had been acquiring Micropro's software products, removing the licenses
from within the shrink-wrap packages, repackaging the software without the licenses, and
renting the repackaged software in violation of the license agreements. Id. at 381. The parties
settled, however, before the Micropro case came to trial. See Schmidt, Validity of Shrink-Wrap
License Agreements, at 1 (Micropro and United settled case) (unpublished article) (available in
Washington and Lee Law Review Office).
On January 17, 1985 Micropro and The Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions (ADAPSO), a software trade organization, co-filed a 20 count complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against American Brands, Inc.
(American) and Wilson Jones Co. (Wilson Jones), a subsidiary of American, for breach of a
shrink-wrap license agreement. See Computerworld, Jan. 21, 1985, at 1. The complaint charged
the defendants with copyright and trademark infringement, unfair competition and breach of
the license agreement for the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of Micropro's Words-
tar, Mailmerger and Spellstar programs. Id. at 6. The defendants filed an answer denying all
charges of software piracy alleged by plaintiffs. See Computerworld, March 11, 1985, at 2
(discussing American's and Wilson Jones' challenge to practice of shrink-wrap licensing). The
defendants challenged the software industry's practice of shrink-wrap licensing on the grounds
that the defendants had not agreed to the license agreements, that the license agreements were
unenforceable because the defendants were the owners of the computer programs, and that the
license agreements were null and void as contrary to public policy. Id. (discussing defendants'
challenge to shrink-wrap licensing). To date the Northern District of Illinois has not ruled in
the Illinois case and ADAPSO has indicated that negotiations for settlement have begun. Id.
Although no court has addressed the issue of the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses yet,
Louisiana has enacted a Software License Enforcement Act. See Software License Enforcement
Act, 1984 La. Acts, No. 744, § 1 (codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1961-:1966 (West
Supp. 1985)). The Louisiana Act binds a user to the terms of a shrink-wrap license agreement
1985] 1351
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the user's right to get what he bargains for. 4 Furthermore, in assessing the
proper amount of protection for intellectual property, the courts must
consider the public's interest in promoting wide availability of ideas. 5
The limitations of the copyright, trade secret and patent laws render
reliance on these methods alone insufficient to protect computer software
fully from piracy.' 6 Copyright laws protect only the expression of an idea,
and not the idea itself.' 7 The expression adopted by the programmer, the
if the license contains a conspicuous and reasonably comprehensible notice warning the user
that using the program or opening the software package constitutes acceptance of the terms of
the license agreement, and allows the user to return the unopened package for a refund. Id.
Additionally, the software proprietor under the Act must package the license agreement in such
a manner that the user readily may examine the license before the act that constitutes acceptance
occurs. Id. Enforceable terms under the Louisiana Act include the proprietor's retention of title
to the copy of the program, prohibitions on copying, modification and further transfer if the
proprietor retains title to the copy of the program, and automatic termination of the license
upon breach of the license. Id.
14. See Davidson, Basic Contract Questions With Respect to "Box-Top" Software
Licenses in COMPUTER LITIGATION 1984: RESOLVING COMPUTER RELATED DISPUTES AND PRO-
TECTING PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 329, 342 (1984) (ultimately courts must strike balance between
interest of vendor and interest of user); supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussion of
need for legal protection of software).
15. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 22 (public concerns include maximizing incentives for
creation of new ideas as well as encouraging free availability of ideas). The Copyright Act
reflects the balanced Congressional purposes of ensuring an adequate reward for creative work
as well as promoting broad public availability of works. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 163-64 (1975) (discussing purposes of copyright law); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (Copyright Act
requires balancing need for wide availability of creative works against need for monetary reward
to authors to assure creation of works) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1974)), modified, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984); see
also infra note 55 (discussing role of copyright law to encourage production and dissemination
of creative works).
16. See infra notes 17-50 and accompanying text (discussing insufficiency of copyright,
trade secret and patent protection for computer software); see also supra notes 2-4 and
accompanying text (discussing problem of software piracy).
17. E.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101
(1879); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
The 1980 Amendments to the Copyright Act clarified the availability of copyright protection
for computer programs. See 17 U.S.C § 101 (1982) (defining computer program); id. § 117
(entitling owner of copy of computer program to make backup copy). Courts generally have
recognized the copyrightability of the computer program in all of its forms, including programs
fixed in object code form and embodied in Read Only Memory (ROM). See Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 522-24 (9th Cir. 1984) (computer programs embodied
in ROMs are copyrightable); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (reaffirming copyright protection for computer program in object
code embodied on ROM), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Arctic
Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that copyright protection is available
for ROMs); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (unauthorized duplication of ROM is within reach of federal copyright laws). But
1352 [Vol. 42:1347
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particular set of instructions, therefore, is copyrightable, but the actual
processes or methods underlying the expression are not within the scope of
copyright protection.' 8 The always ambiguous line between copying an idea
and borrowing the expression is especially uncertain in the context of
computer software.' 9 In copyright infringement actions the courts focus on
the similarities in protectible expression." Substantial similarity of expression
constitutes copyright infringement'.2  When the idea is only capable of
expression in one form, however, copyright protects only against identical
copying.22 When a program can be expressed in numerous ways, programmers
simply can read the lawfully obtained copy of the copyrighted program and
use the ideas embodied in the program in preparing their own work.23
see Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(copying of ROM is not actionable under copyright law), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (1980).
18. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)
(one cannot copyright underlying computer process, only particular set of instructions); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252-53 (3d Cir. 1983) (expression
adopted by programmer is copyrightable element in computer program, and actual processes or
methods embodied in program are not within scope of copyright law) (quoting H. R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 5659,
5670), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
19. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th
Cir.) (no litmus paper test exists by which to apply idea-expression distinction), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253
(3d Cir. 1983) (many courts have found difficulty in articulating distinction between idea and
expression), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). In distinguishing between an idea and an
expression, courts must consider the need to preserve the balance between competition and
protection reflected in the copyright and patent laws. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253.
20. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th
Cir.) (focus in copyright infringement action is on similarities in protectible expression), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1282
(N.D. 11. 1983) (finding no copyright infringement where no substantial similarity existed in
copyrightable portions of games).
21. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th
Cir.) (enunciating substantial similarity test), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Williams Elec.,
Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1281 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (applying substantial
similarity test in finding copyright infringement). Because of the unavailability of direct evidence
of copying, courts may infer copying where the defendant had access to the copyrighted work
and the defendant's work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. See Atari, 672 F.2d
at 614.
22. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir.) (where idea and expression are indistinguishable, copyright protects against only identical
copying), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). When an idea and its expression are inseparable,
protecting the expression would confer a monopoly of the idea on the copyright owner and
would interfere with patent law. See id. (quoting Herbert Rosesenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kulpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)) (no bar exists on copying expression when idea
and expression are inseparable because protecting expression would confer monopoly of idea
free of patent law limitations).
23. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)
(when other language is available to accomplish given task, programmers are free to read
copyrighted programs and use ideas embodied in programs) (citing National Commission on
19851 1353
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Moreover, when only one way to express a given set of instructions exists,
copyright at most protects only against actual copying. 24 The protection
afforded to computer programs by copyright law, therefore, is limited. 
2
Furthermore, there is some question as to the level in the development of a
computer program at which copyright protection first attaches.
26
Limitations on the rights of copyright owners under the Copyright Act
further reduce the effectiveness of copyright as a means of protecting
proprietary rights in computer programs. Although the Copyright Act grants
the owner of a copyright exclusive rights to reproduce, transfer and adapt
works, these rights are subject to limitations. 27 One such limitation, the "first
sale doctrine" codified in section 109 of the Copyright Act, limits the
proprietor's right to vend his work by entitling the owner of a particular
copy to sell or transfer possession of that copy. 2 The courts consistently
have construed the first sale doctrine as requiring a transfer of title or
ownership rather than mere rightful possession before a first sale occurs and
terminates the proprietor's right to control the disposition of the copy.
29
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report, at 20 (1979)); see also P.
HoFmaiN, supra note 1, at 2.2-2 (programmer may study ideas, methods and technologies used
in source program and develop program using those ideas without infringing copyright).
24. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)
(when specific instructions are only method of accomplishing given task, another's use of those
instructions does not infringe copyright); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.) (similarity of expression is not actionable when idea is only
capable of expression in one form), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
25. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of copyright
protection for computer programs).
26. See N. HENRY, supra note 3, at 44 (distinction between copyrightable element of
expression in computer program and process underlying program is difficult to make because
of various ways in which one can make copies of computer program); see also supra note 1
(discussing various stages of development of computer program). The various ways in which
one can copy a program include copying the programmer's coding sheets, using a tape that
embodies the program to produce a printed version of the program, copying the tape and using
the copy to produce a printed version of the program, and copying the program into the
memory of a computer and producing a readable version. See N. HENRY, supra note 3, at 44-
45 (describing various ways in which one can misappropriate computer program). The point at
which one appropriates the process rather than the expression is uncertain. See id. at 45 (various
ways in which one uses programs make distinction between expression and process unclear).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (granting exclusive rights to owner of copyright); id. §§
107-18 (limitations on exclusive rights of copyright owner).
28. See id. § 109 (granting right to sell or otherwise dispose of particular copy to owner
of such copy); see also United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1979) (first sale
doctrine provides that parting of title to particular copy of copyrighted work divests copyright
owner of right to vend that copy); United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977)
(analyzing first sale doctrine in context of criminal prosecution for copyright infringement),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.)
(copyright proprietor's right to vend his work under copyright laws is not absolute, but is
subject to first sale doctrine), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977). Section 109(c) of the Copyright
Act provides that the privilege to transfer a particular copy does not extend to persons who
have acquired possession without acquiring ownership of the copy. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1982).
29. See United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977) (cases consistently
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Under a restrictive license agreement that effectively reserves title to the copy
of the program in the proprietor, therefore, no first sale occurs and the
proprietor may restrict even subsequent sales or transfers of the copy.30 In
certain circumstances, however, courts have interpreted license agreements
as transferring title to the copy.3 Section 107 of the Copyright Act further
limits the exclusive rights of the copyright owner through provisions govern-
ing the fair use of a copyrighted work. 32 Section 107 enumerates the factors
courts must consider in determining whether a particular unauthorized use
is a fair use and, therefore, not an infringement of the copyright. 33 Addi-
tionally, section 117 of the Copyright Act entitles an owner of a copy of a
have construed first sale doctrine as requiring transfer of title or ownership, rather than mere
transfer of possession), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180,
1187 (9th Cir.) (judicial gloss on copyright statute requires transfer of title before first sale can
occur), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); see also 2 M. NIMMDR, NnNaNMR ON CoPYIUom-
(Bender) § 8.12[B][1], at 8-120 (1984 ed.) (transfer of title triggers first sale doctrine).
30. See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.) (finding that license
agreements did not constitute sales), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); cf. S&H Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 421-22 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (upholding restrictive
license agreement that prohibited redistribution of software contingent upon finding of valid
copyright). In United States v. Wise, the Ninth Circuit considered whether certain license
agreements for the exhibition of films in reality were sales of the films. 550 F.2d at 1190. The
motion picture studios that produced the films had obtained valid copyrights and had distributed
each film pursuant to a license agreement. Id. at 1184. The Wise court noted that the designation
of the contracts as licenses, the transfer of limited rights for a limited purpose and time period,
the reservation of title to the film prints, and the requirement of return at the expiration of the
contract term were relevant considerations. Id. at 1190. The Ninth Circuit found the language
reserving title in the distributor to be particularly indicative of a license arrangement and
concluded that the agreements at issue did not constitute first sales. Id. at 1191. Since no first
sale had occurred, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction of copyright infringe-
ment for illegally selling the motion pictures. Id. at 1195.
31. See United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (construing license
as sale where proprietor did not reserve title in copies); see also United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d
1180, 1191, 1192 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding certain license agreements constituted first sales); infra
notes 119-123 and accompanying text (discussing when transfer pursuant to license agreement
results in first sale). In United States v. Wells, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas considered whether a first sale had occurred for purposes of a criminal
prosecution for copyright infringement. Id. at 633-34. The government prosecuted the defendant
in Wells for the unauthorized sale of copies of aerial survey maps licensed to him. Id. at 632.
The license granted to the defendant restricted the defendant's rights to sell or transfer the
maps. Id. The Wells court analyzed the relationship between the copyright proprietor and the
licensee and concluded that since the proprietor had failed to reserve title to the copies, title to
the copies belonged to the licensee. Id. at 634. The Wells court held that under the license at
issue the transfer of copies by the defendant did not constitute copyright infringement and the
court, therefore, acquitted the defendant. Id. The Wells court did suggest, however, that the
copyright proprietor might have a breach of contract action against the licensee to enforce the
license restrictions on the transfer of copies. Id.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
33. See id. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that courts shall consider the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the portion used, and the economic effect of the use in determining whether
the use in a particular case is a fair use. Id.; see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
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computer program to make a backup copy without infringing the copyright. 4
Since the scope of protection afforded to computer software by copyright is
uncertain and limited in several respects, reliance on copyright alone is
ineffective to prevent software piracy."5
Trade secret laws afford an alternative means of protection for computer
software. Most states have adopted the definition of trade secret set forth in
the Restatement of Torts.16 The Restatement definition requires that to
constitute a trade secret, an idea must satisfy the conditions of novelty,
secrecy and economic value.17 Matters of general knowledge in the industry
cannot constitute trade secrets. Furthermore, the proprietor must protect
the secrecy of a trade secret in order to maintain the trade secret.3 9 Although
trade secret law protects a proprietor against the unauthorized use or
disclosure of a trade secret by any person in a confidential relationship,
40
Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 448-54 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (applying factors codified in § 107 to determine
whether use is fair use), modified, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
35. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainties and limitations
of copyright protection afforded to software).
36. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) (defining trade secret); see also
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974) (adopting widely recognized
definition of trade secret in Restatement of Torts); Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 592 F. Supp.
1021, 1028-29 (D.R.I. 1984) (court's adoption of Restatement definition of trade secret corre-
sponds with majority of courts). Under the Restatement of Torts, a trade secret is any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information used in one's business which gives him an
advantage over competitors. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
37. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475, 476 (1974) (subject of trade secret must be secret and not matter of
public knowledge; some novelty required for trade secret); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Michael
E. Heisley Heico, Inc., No. 84-1155, slip op. at _(3d Cir. Feb. 4, 1985) (requirements of
trade secret include secrecy, economic value and novelty) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library,
Cases file); J. SOMA, supra note 1, at 52-54 (four requirements of trade secret are appropriate
subject matter, secrecy, novelty and economic value).
38. E.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); SI Handling Sys.,
Inc. v. Michael E. Heisley Heico, Inc., No. 84-1155, slip op. at _.-(3d Cir. Feb. 4, 1985)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cases file); University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngs-
town Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 n.25 (5th Cir. 1974). Trade secrecy requires minimal novelty, to
the extent necessary to show that the secret is not a matter of public knowledge. SI Handling
Sys., No. 84-1155, slip op. at _; see Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476 (secrecy implies at least
minimal novelty).
39. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (subject of trade
secret must be secret); University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518,
535 (5th Cir. 1974) (proprietor's use of caution in preserving confidentiality of system was
relevant to finding that system was trade secret within meaning of RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
757). Although a proprietor must preserve the secrecy of a trade secret, the necessary element
of secrecy is not lost if the holder reveals the trade secret in confidence. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at
475.
40. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (trade secret protects
against disclosure or unauthorized use of trade secret by those to whom proprietor confided
trade secret under restriction of nondisclosure or use); University Computing Co. v. Lykes-
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974) (person who discloses or uses another's
trade secret in breach of confidence is liable for misappropriation).
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and also protects against the disclosure or use of knowledge that the
disclosing party obtained by improper means, 4' trade secret law does not
protect against independent invention or reverse engineering.4 2 Trade secret
protection, therefore, does not extend to proprietary information that does
not meet the requisites of a trade secret, nor to information legally acquired.
43
Trade secret protection, consequently, is limited in scope and generally
unavailable for mass-marketed software products."
Patent laws provide protection against independent creation as well as
copying if an invention meets the rigorous statutory requirements for the
issuance of a patent.4 5 The subject matter of a patent, however, extends only
to inventions that meet the conditions of novelty, utility and nonobvious-
ness.4 6 Although an algorithm or mathematical formula cannot be the subject
of a patent, 47 a process is not unpatentable merely because it uses a
mathematical formula or algorithm. 4 The statutory requirements of novelty
and nonobviousness, however, limit the patentiability of computer pro-
41. See Kewanee Oil Co. V. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974) (trade secret law
protects against disclosure or use of knowledge that one gained by improper means) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a) (1939)); University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974) (person who discloses or uses another's trade secret
discovered by improper means is liable in tort).
42. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (trade secret law does
not protect against discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention or by
reverse engineering); University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534
(5th Cir. 1974) (limited protection afforded by trade secret law lasts only as long as competitors
fail to duplicate trade secret by legitimate, independent research). Reverse engineering is the
process of starting with a known product and working backward to discover the process
underlying the development of the product. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476 (describing process
of reverse engineering).
43. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of trade secret
protection).
44. See P. HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 2.3-1-2 (at some point maintaining secrecy becomes
difficult or impossible); J. SoMA, supra note I, at 68 (proprietors generally cannot use trade
secret protection for mass-marketed software products because of difficulty in maintaining
secrecy).
45. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982) (governing patentability of invention); see also
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1974) (patent protection extends not
only to copying but also to independent creation).
46. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982) (enumerating conditions for patentability); Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1974) (subject matter of patent must fulfill
conditions of novelty, utility and non-obviousness).
47. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (algorithm or mathematical formula
is like law of nature, which cannot be subject of patent); Parker V. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585
(1978) (discovery of mathematical formula is not patentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 67 (1972) (mathematical formula is not patentable). The fact that a mathematical formula
is not a patentable invention rests on the rule that a mere idea is not patentable. Benson, 409
U.S. at 67.
48. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (subject matter otherwise within
statutory subject matter under patent law does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses
computer program); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (process is not unpatentable
simply because it uses mathematical algorithm).
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grams. 49 Although patent protection is comprehensive in scope, a patent for
a computer program is difficult to obtain. 0
A software developer can use a license agreement in conjunction with
either copyright or trade secret protection to obtain comprehensive protection
of his proprietary rights in the software." The express terms of the license
agreement govern the user's rights to the product and supplement the limited
protection afforded by copyright and trade secret laws.5 2 Software developers
commonly use license agreements to protect software,53 and courts generally
have upheld the use of license agreements in the software industry and in
other industries to protect a proprietor's copyright and trade secret rights.
4
Of primary importance to copyright law is the need to allow the proprietor
49. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (finding computer program ineligible
for patent because processes involved were well known and contained no inventive concept);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 71 (1972) (rejecting patent for computer program that
failed to meet requirements of novelty and usefulness). But see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191-93 (1981) (process for molding of rubber products employing programmed digital
computer was subject matter eligible for patent protection). In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme
Court noted that difficult policy questions surround the availability of patent protection for
computer programs and suggested that Congress could best address the issue through legislation.
437 U:S. at 595.
50. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing availability of patent
protection for computer programs).
51. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing protection provided by license
agreement).
52. See S&H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 421 (M.D. Tenn. 1983)
(express terms of license agreement govern access to product); supra notes 16-50 and accom-
panying text (discussing limited protection afforded by copyright, trade secret and patent laws).
In S&H Computer Sys. v. SAS Inst., Inc., the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee considered a software distributor's motion for summary judgment on its
claims of copyright infringement and breach of license agreement. 568 F. Supp. at 417, 418. In
S&H, SAS Institute, Inc. (SAS) had distributed statistical software to S&H Computer Systems
(S&H) pursuant to a license agreement that granted S&H the right to use the software. Id. On
June 3, 1982, SAS terminated its license agreement with S&H because S&H allegedly had
violated the agreement. Id. at 418. SAS sued S&H for breach of contract, alleging that S&H
had used the program on nondesignated computers and had created unauthorized copies of the
program in violation of the license agreement. Id. at 420. The S&H court analyzed the license
agreement in light of the policies of limiting access and preventing unauthorized exploitation of
the product. Id. at 421. The district court found that S&H had breached the license agreement
by using the programs on nondesignated computers and making unauthorized copies of the
program and the court, therefore, granted SAS's motion for summary judgment for breach of
contract. Id. The S&H court, however, noted that the finding of a breach of contract remained
contingent upon a finding that SAS had a valid copyright in the software, an issue reserved for
trial. Id. The S&H court also granted SAS' motion for summary judgment for S&H's copyright
infringement, contingent upon a finding of a valid copyright in the software. Id. at 422.
53. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing software industry's use of license
agreements).
54. See Textron, Inc. v. Teleoperator Sys. Corp., 554 F. Supp. 315, 325-27 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (enjoining defendant from appropriating technology in violation of license agreement);
see also supra note 12 (discussion of cases upholding software license agreements); cf. United
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.) (recognizing and upholding motion picture
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to control his work through restrictive licenses.5 5 A licensee infringes the
copyright by any use of the work exceeding the rights that the proprietor
granted to him in the license. 6 Even if a licensee has not infringed the
copyright, he may have breached the license agreement.5 7 Through a license
agreement the proprietor also can protect information, knowledge or tech-
nology that would not qualify as a trade secret.58 Through license agreements,
therefore, a software developer can impose restrictions on the use of his
product and gain greater protection of the software than he could obtain by
the use of copyright or trade secret protection alone.
Although the mainframe software industry's usage of license agreements
is well established, the microcomputer software industry faces special diffi-
culties in licensing software. The mainframe industry traditionally has in-
volved costly, service-supported software distributed to commercial users
industry's practice of licensing use of films), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1976) (license granted for use of
underlying script governed use of derivative recorded television program); George Simon, Inc.
v. Spatz, 492 F. Supp. 836, 838 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (power to license public performance of
musical works on stipulated terms is incidental to property right of copyright owner).
55. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976)
(ability of copyright holder to control his work remains paramount in copyright law); S&H
Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 421 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (fundamental
purpose of license agreement is to prevent unauthorized exploitation of product). Allowing the
copyright holder to control his work through restrictive licenses reinforces the role of copyright
law in encouraging the production and dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate
legal protection for one who submits his work to the public. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21, 23. The
premise of American copyright law is to provide an economic incentive for artistic and
intellectual creation. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (purpose of copyright
clause in federal Constitution is to promote progress of science and arts, and Congress may
accomplish purpose by encouraging intellectual and artistic creation through reward in form of
author's control over his work); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (economic philosophy
behind copyright clause is to encourage individual effort in science and arts by ensuring personal
gain); Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation is
foundation of American copyright law).
56. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976)
(any use of work that exceeds license granted by proprietor of copyright constitutes infringement
of copyright in work); S&H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 422
(M.D. Tenn. 1983) (courts long have noted that licensee infringes copyright by exceeding
license); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 544 (W.D. Tex.
1980) (licensee infringes copyright by exceeding his license) (citing Gilliam v. American Broad-
casting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976)).
57. See Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1981)
(mere breach of covenant may support breach of contract claim but will not constitute copyright
infringement); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.) (vendee may be liable for
breach of agreement although he is not guilty of copyright infringement), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
929 (1977); Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 516 (3d Cir. 1961) (purchaser
may be liable for violation of agreement although he is not guilty of copyright infringement).
58. See Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp.,
401 F. Supp. 1102, 1114 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (defendants were liable for breach of contract for
disclosing confidential information even if information was not trade secret).
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pursuant to direct transactions that include a mutually signed license agree-
ment.5 9 In the microcomputer industry, however, proprietors typically mass-
market low-priced, prepackaged software through a distributor to an end
user. 60 The software proprietor sought methods to preserve his market and
protect software through the use of license restrictions in the microcomputer
industry. 6' The shrink-wrap license became a popular method of licensing
software in the microcomputer industry because of the impracticality of
obtaining the signature of every end user on a license agreement.
62
Shrink-wrap license agreements contain terms similar to traditional soft-
ware license agreements, but differ from traditional software agreements in
59. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2 (in mainframe industry, most software
vendors distribute software pursuant to direct transactions that include mutually signed license
agreement); Reynolds, supra note 9, at 550 (software packages developed for use on mainframes
are complex and costly to develop, and buyers of such software packages are generally
sophisticated in commercial market place).
60. See Gammon, Manufacturer-User Disputes Involving Microprocessors and Personal
Computers in COMPUTER LITIGATION 1984: REsoLvNG COMPUTER RELATED DISPUTES AND
PROTECTING PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 433, 435 (Practising Law Institute, 1984) (outlining typical
software distribution in microcomputer industry); Raysman & Brown, Mass Distributed Soft-
ware-Royalties, N.Y.L.J., March 8, 1983, reprinted in 2 Sos'rvARE PROTECTION AND MARKET-
ING: COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DATA BASES; VIDEO GAMES AND MOTION PICTURES 393, 393
(Practising Law Institute, 1983) (discussing mass-distribution of software) [hereinafter cited as
Software Royalties]; J. SOMA, supra note 1, at 74 (describing software mass-market); Wester-
meier, User Vendor Microcomputer Disputes in COMPUTER LITIGATION 1984: REsoLvING COM-
PUTER RELATED DISPUTES AND PROTECTING PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 443, 447 (Practising Law
Institute, 1984) (discussing characteristics of microcomputer market). The recent growth of
inexpensive microcomputers for personal and small business applications has created a need for
mass-marketed software. See Software Royalties, supra, at 393 (discussing growth of computer
software mass-market). The software industry emerged with the unbundling of computer
hardware and software (the separation of hardware and software sales) in 1969, and the resulting
commercial availability of application software separate from hardware. See id. (discussing
reasons for growth of software mass-market); see also Brooks, supra note 2, at 24-25 (describing
software markets). A new segment of the software industry developed with distribution on a
mass market basis. See Software Royalties, supra, at 393 (discussing growth of software mass-
market). Increasingly, software vendors are mass-marketing software through retail stores,
bookstores and the mail. See M. SCOTT, supra note 13, § 6.31, at 6-28 (more software vendors
are mass-marketing software). Since packaged software prices are too low for software vendors
to provide advice and training to users, well-documented and reliable software is necessary in
the mass-market. See J. SOMA, supra note 1, at 89 (discussing contracts for mass-marketing
software).
61. See M. SCOTT, supra note 13, § 6.31, at 6-28 (vendors seek to preserve market through
use of license restrictions in mass-market).
62. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2 (mass-marketers of microcomputer software
have abandoned bilateral contracts for marketing and practical reasons); Reynolds, supra note
9, at 550 (with microcomputer and mass distribution of software, formal licensing is not cost
justified); M. SCOTT, supra note 13, § 6.31, at 6-28 (because it is not feasible to obtain
individually-signed license agreement in mass-market, software vendors have resorted to shrink-
wrap licenses in attempt to protect software); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussing use of shrink-wrap licenses in microcomputer industry). The mass-marketing of
software through distributors precludes any direct relationship between the software user and
the software developer. See J. SossA, supra note 1, at 89-94 (discussing contracts in mass
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the manner of execution. Software proprietors typically use copyright pro-
tection in conjunction with the shrink-wrap license agreement. 63 Most license
agreements contain provisions restricting the user's rights to copy, use,
transfer and modify the software. 64 Although some licenses allow limited
copying, transfer and modification rights, others allow none of these rights
whatsoever, or none of these rights without the proprietor's prior written
consent.65 Frequently, licenses limit the use of the software to a single
computer, allowing the user to make only one back-up copy, and to modify
the program only for purposes of use on the single computer. 66 If the license
permits the user to transfer rights in the program, such authorization is
generally on the express condition that if the user transfers the program, he
must transfer the program along with all copies and must secure the
agreement of the party receiving the program and copies to adhere to the
license terms. 67 Although some licenses provide that the software developer
retains ownership of the licensed program and all intellectual and proprietary
rights to the program, 6s many licenses do not address the issue of ownership
rights in the software. 69 Even if the proprietor retains ownership of the
intellectual property, most shrink-wrap licenses do not explicitly retain
ownership of the particular copy of the program in the proprietor. 70 Provi-
sions limiting remedies and disclaiming warranties are also standard . 7 The
marketing of computer software). Software developers, therefore, generally communicate with
users only by means of notices printed on the software packaging. See Raysman, Problems in
Mass Distribution of Software in 2 SoFrwARi PROTECTION AND MARKETING: COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMS AND DATA BASES; VIoEO GAMES AND MOTION PICrtREs 363, 365 (Practising Law Institute,
1983) (discussing difficulty of obtaining user's signature on license agreement).
63. See Laurie, Software Rental: The Publisher's Perspective in COMPUTER LITIGATION
1984: RESOLVING COMPUTER RELATED DISPUTES AND PROTECTING PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 351, 393-
406 app. (1984) (sample license agreements); appendix attached (IBM shrink-wrap license
agreement).
64. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); appendix
attached (IBM shrink-wrap license agreement).
65. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreement); appendix
attached (IBM shrink-wrap license agreement).
66. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); appendix
attached (IBM shrink-wrap license agreement); see also Stern & Todd, Enforceability of Specific
Provisions Contained in Box-Top Licenses in COMPUTER LITIGATION 1984: RESOLVING COMPUTER
RELATED DISPUTES AND PROTECTING PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 343, 347-49 (Practising Law Institute,
1984) (discussing typical provisions in shrink-wrap software license).
67. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); appendix
attached (IBM shrink-wrap license agreement); see also Stern & Todd, supra note 66, at 347-48
(discussing limited scope of software license).
68. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); appendix
attached (IBM shrink-wrap license); see also Stern & Todd, supra note 66, at 348 (discussing
provisions of software license).
69. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements).
70. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); First Sale,
supra note 9, at 20 (many licenses fail to distinguish title to copies from title to copyrights and
are ambiguous in their expression of vendors' intentions to retain title to copies).
71. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); attached
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agreements almost invariably provide that automatic termination of the user's
rights occurs upon any breach of the license agreement.
72
Some question exists whether the shrink-wrap license creates a binding
contract that the software developer can enforce.7 3 The validity of the shrink-
wrap license may depend upon the manner in which the software developer
packages the software. Some software proprietors package computer pro-
grams and documentation in a box-like package that contains a license
agreement on the back of the box, visible through the transparent cellophane
wrapping. Other developers, however, do not provide the license agreement
on the back of the software package, but instead include the agreement
inside the package with the software and documentation. Although the user
may not have an opportunity to read the license agreement before purchasing
the software, the user always has an opportunity to read the agreement
before opening the separate diskette package or using the software. Some
shrink-wrap licenses request the user's signature on a registration card that
the user must return to obtain any warranty protections, and that acknowl-
edges the user's acceptance of the terms of the license agreement.7 4 Shrink-
wrap licenses are fixed in form and do not contemplate any bargaining
between the developer and purchaser over terms. Through the use of shrink-
wrap licenses, therefore, the software developer normally subjects the user
to whatever restrictions the software developer places on the software.7 6 If
appendix (IBM shrink-wrap license agreement); see also Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2
(shrink-wrap licenses almost always contain clauses disclaiming warranties and limiting liability);
Stern & Todd, supra note 66, at 349 (discussing warranty and limitation of liability provisions
in licenses). The limitation of lability is a key provision for the economic survival of the
software developer since consequential damages from program malfunctions can be very
expensive. See Raysman, supra note 62, at 368 (limiting liability for damages is key to economic
survival of software developer).
72. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); attached
appendix (IBM shrink-wrap license). The term of the license usually lasts until breach of the
license agreement or other termination pursuant to the termination clause. See Stern & Todd,
supra note 66, at 348 (discussing duration of license). Upon termination, the license often
requires the return of the program or the destruction of the program and all copies. Id.; see
Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); attached appendix (IBM
shrink-wrap license).
73. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2 (questioning whether and to what degree
shrink-wrap license is enforceable); Reynolds, supra note 9, at 549 (questioning validity of
shrink-wrap license arrangement).
74. See First Sale, supra note 9, at 19 (separate warranty registration cards sometimes
accompany licenses); Raysman & Brown, supra note 9, at 2 (some licenses require end user's
signature on registration card); see also Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample software
licenses and warranty registration cards). Some license forms offer inducements such as upgraded
products, warranty protection, or service and maintenance support in order to secure the user's
signature on the warranty card. See First Sale, supra note 9, at 19 (some program proprietors
offer incentives to obtain signatures and executed bilateral license forms from users). The
warranty registration cards on which the developer secures the user's signature are similar to
those accompanying purchases of many consumer products. See id.
75. See First Sale, supra note 9, at 19 (few licenses contemplate bargaining for terms).
76. See Immel, The Software Rental Brouhaha, 3 PoPuLAR CoMPunNG No. 5, 51, 52
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the user does not agree to be bound by the license terms, the user may return
the unopened software package or separate diskette package for a refund of
the purchase price.
77
Because of the inherent problems in defining the nature of software, it
is unclear what law applies to licensed software. For example, the courts
have not yet determined whether the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or
the Common Law of Contracts applies to licensed software. 7 Article 2 of
the UCC applies only to sales transactions in goods, and defines goods as
all things that are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale.79 It is unclear whether the transfer of licensed software from a vendor
to a user constitutes the sale of a good within the meaning of the UCC. 0
Although no court has considered whether packaged software is a good
within the UCC definition, several courts have applied the UCC to combined
sales of hardware and software.8'
(1984) (license subjects software user to whatever restrictions manufacturer imposes on licensed
programs); see also supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (discussing proprietor's attempted
control of product through license agreements).
77. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample software licenses); attached
appendix (IBM shrink-wrap license).
78. See infra notes 79-124 (analyzing applicability of Uniform Commercial Code to
software licenses). The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) differs from the Common Law of
contract in a number of ways. Under the UCC a modification of an existing contract needs no
consideration to be binding, whereas the common law of contracts requires consideration for a
modification. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978) (no requirement of consideration for modification); S.
MANDELL, supra note 1, at 12 (additional consideration necessary to modify common law
contract). Additionally, no warranties, right of rejection, right of revocation or remedies exist
under common law unless the contract specifies such, whereas the UCC provides such rights
unless the parties agree otherwise. See S. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 38 (common law rule of
caveat emptor provides no warranties, right of rejection, right of revocation or remedies);
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978) (seller creates express warranties by affirmation of fact, description of
goods and sample or model); id. § 2-314 (contract for sale of goods implies warranty of
merchantability if seller is merchant of goods in kind); id. § 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness
for particular purpose arises where seller has reason to know of particular purpose for which
buyer needs goods and that buyer is relying on seller's judgment to select suitable goods); id. §
2-601 (buyer may reject nonconforming goods); id. § 2-608 (buyer may revoke acceptance of
goods whose non-conformity substantially impairs value in limited circumstances); id. §§ 2-701
- 2-718 (governing remedies).
79. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978) (Article 2 applies to transactions in goods); id. § 2-105(1)
(goods means all things movable at time of identification to contract for sale).
80. See id. § 2-106(1) (sale consists in passing of title from seller to buyer for price); infra
notes 110-123 and accompanying text (analyzing whether license of software consititutes sale).
81. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.N.J.
1979) (Article 2 of UCC is applicable law for leasing arrangement of computer hardware and
software), modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982);
Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (contract
for sale of package consisting of hardware and software constitutes contract for sale of goods
under UCC), modified, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs
Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (applying UCC to bundled sale of computer
equipment and programs), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974). A "bundled" sale is a sale of
computer hardware for the same price with or without the related programming. Burroughs,
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In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 2 for example, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered
whether the UCC applied to the sale of a computer system including both
hardware and software components."3 In Triangle, Triangle Underwriters,
Inc. (Triangle) brought suit against Honeywell, Inc. (Honeywell) alleging
that Honeywell had breached its contract and its warranties with Triangle
by failing to supply a fully operational software system to fulfill Triangle's
data processing needs and by failing to correct the deficiencies. 84 Honeywell
argued, on a motion for summary judgment, that the UCC's four year
statute of limitations barred the action. 8 Triangle contended that the com-
puter system did not consist solely of goods within the meaning of the UCC,
and that what Honeywell sold predominantly constituted services.8 6 The New
York district court recognized that if the system essentially involved the
provision of services, the UCC would not apply, and instead, the longer six
year statute of limitations applicable to contracts actions under the New
York Code would apply.8 7 The Triangle court analyzed the nature of the sale
and concluded that the computer system did not consist principally of
services.88 The New York district court reasoned that Triangle was purchasing
the product of the ideas or concepts involved in the software, and found
that although the product required efforts to produce, and was intangible,
it was a product more readily characterized as goods than services.8 9 Because
the design, installation, and maintenance services that Honeywell provided
361 F. Supp. at 334. The bundling of software with hardware, therefore, virtually forces the
customer to accept the software. See id. The practice of bundling computer sales in some
instances constitutes an illegal tying arrangement in violation of the Federal Antitrust laws. See
Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant's
practice of bundling software with hardware is per se illegal); see also Fortner Enter., Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-500 (1969) (tying arrangement is illegal if it
unreasonably restrains competition).
82. 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
83. Id. at 769.
84. Id. at 767. In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., Triangle Underwriters,
Inc. (Triangle) alleged that various programs it had purchased from Honeywell, Inc. contained
errors and did not function as Honeywell had represented and that Honeywell had been
unsuccessful in its attempts to correct the deficiencies. Id.
85. Id. at 768; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (Consol. 1964) (party must bring action for
breach of contract for sale within four years after cause of action has accrued).
86. Id. at 767. Under the contract in Triangle, Honeywell was to install the system and
train Triangle employees to use the system before Triangle would assume supervision of the
sytem. Id. The proposal did not require Honeywell to update or amend the software. Id.
87. Id. at 769. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 213(2) (McKinney 1972) (party must commence
contract action within six years of date on which cause of action accrues). If applicable in the
Triangle case, the four year statute of limitations under the UCC would have barred the action.
457 F. Supp. at 768. The alleged breach occurred in January, 1971, the date of installation,
and Triangle brought suit in August, 1975. Id.
88. 457 F. Supp. at 769. The Triangle district court noted that the agreement at issue
contemplated delivery of a completed and operational system. Id. After the installation and
training period, Honeywell's only obligation was to maintain the system. Id.
89. Id.
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were incidental to the sale, the Triangle court held that the sale was subject
to the UCC statute of limitations, and granted Honeywell's motion for
summary judgment.9
On appeal, the Second Circuit in Triangle applied the rule that a contract
is for service rather than sale when service predominates and the sale is
merely incidental to the contract. 9' The Second Circuit reasoned that the
Honeywell contract was a contract for sale because the services Honeywell
supplied were merely incidental to the sale of the computer system. 92 The
Second Circuit concluded that the limitation of compensation to the purchase
price of the hardware, with no billing for services, was indicative of a
contract for the sale of goods and not for the rendition of professional
services.93 The Second Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's holding
concerning the applicability of the UCC to the sale, but did not adopt the
lower court's classification of software itself as a good.
94
Although courts have found the UCC applicable to combined sales of
hardware and software, the Triangle court's incidental services analysis does
not apply to separately sold, prepackaged software. 95 The nature of software
makes its classification as either a good or a service difficult because the
essence of the computer program is the intangible information contained on
the tangible diskette. 96 The entire value of the program lies in the intangible
intellectual property recorded on the diskette.97 Furthermore, the creation of
software involves substantial services and is a labor-intensive production
process. 9 The UCC does not apply to contracts in which the supply of goods
90. Id.
91. 604 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 743.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 741. In Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey considered whether a leasing arrangement of computer
hardware and software constituted a sale of goods. 479 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.N.J. 1979). After
acquiring the computer system from National Cash Register Corp. (NCR), Chatlos Sys., Inc.
(Chatlos) discovered that the programs were not fully operational and that the computer did
not perform as NCR had represented. Id. at 742. Accordingly, Chatlos sued NCR for breach
of contract, breach of warranties, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 740. In considering
Chatlos' claims, the Chatlos court held that the leasing arrangement constituted a sale of goods,
notwithstanding the incidental service aspects of the transaction. Id. at 742. The Chatlos court
thus concluded that Article 2 of the UCC was the law applicable to Chatlos' claims. Id.
95. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 64 (one cannot readily characterize software as mere
incident to hardware). Since developers frequently sell software separately from hardware, one
must characterize the software in its own right and not merely as part of a bundled sale of
hardware and software. See id., at 64-65 (discussing characterizatin of software as good or
service).
96. See supra note 1 (describing computer software).
97. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 9 (value of computer program lies in investment, know-
how, design, unique logic, and coherence of program rather than in value of blank diskette).
98. See id. at 65 (processes of defining, creating, and installing software may involve
substantial services); P. Hormt, supra note 1, at 3.2-1 (software is intangible with strong
service element); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MicH. L. REv.
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is merely incidental to services provided. 99 In the case of packaged software
sales, the cost of the goods and the seller supplies, the diskette, is incidental
to the cost of the services the seller provides, the recorded information.'00
The product in its entirety, however, consists of the diskette embodying the
program, which is movable. 0' The question whether packaged software is a
good, therefore, turns on whether the transaction is essentially a sale of the
tangible embodiment of the program or the transfer of intangible informa-
tion.'02
In Triangle, the district court adopted the approach that Triangle was
purchasing the product of the concepts involved in custom designed software,
and characterized the product as goods even though the product required
substantial effort to produce.' 3 Under this analysis, packaged software is
analogous to record albums, books and movies, which the courts consistently
have held to be goods under the UCC.' °4 The programmer's ideas become
embodied in the program diskette, just as a composer's music becomes
embodied in a record, an author's ideas become embodied in a book and a
1149, 1151 (1979) (noting that computer program involves labor-intensive production process);
see also Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F, slip op. at ._..(D. Mass. Dec.
18, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file) (sale of hardware and software
system is complex transaction that involves both sales of goods and delivery of services and
does not fit neatly within language of UCC § 2-102).
99. See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1979)
(contract is for service rather than sale when service predominates, and UCC does not apply to
contract); Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co., 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 597, 598 (1975)
(majority of jurisdictions distinguish between sale and service on basis of whether service is
merely incidental to materials supplied to determine whether UCC warranties apply to transac-
tion); St. Luke's Hospital v. Schmaltz, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. (CALtom) 65, 68 (1975)
(adopting rationale that supplying blood by hospital for transfusion is only incidental to
providing medical services and, therefore, UCC warranties do not apply to transaction); Gross
Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 37 U.C.C. RP. SERv. (CALLAGHAN) 1460, 1464 (1983)
(applying UCC to contract for printing of magazine where services were merely incidental to
delivery of final product).
100. See S. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 9-10 (cost of good supplied, which is diskette, is
incidental to cost of services rendered); cf. Brooks, supra note 2, at 9 (value of computer
program lies in information supplied on diskette rather than in value of blank diskette).
101. See S. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 10 (one could characterize transaction as sale of
physical embodiment of program); P. HoFImAN, supra note 1, at 3.2-1 (software vendors
usually sell software product as deliverables).
102. See S. MANDELL, supra note 1, at 9-10 (one could characterize transaction as sale of
physical embodiment of program, which is tangible, or as transfer of pure information, which
is intangible).
103. 457 F. Supp. at 769. See generally Note, supra note 98 (contracts for computer
programs are transactions in goods governed by Article 2 of UCC). The intellectual property
of the computer program is distinguishable from the tangible copy of those instructions which
the user pruchases. See Note, supra note 98, at 1151 (distinguishing between buying intellectual
property of program and buying particular copy). The transaction essentially is a sale of a
physical copy of the program's instructions with retention of intellectual property rights in the
proprietor. Id. n.1l.
104. See Note, supra note 98, at 1151 (analogy of software to record or book); see also
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screen writer's ideas become embodied in a movie. 0 5 Records, books and
movies also require substantial services and effort to produce. In these
analogous fields, the Copyright Act recognizes an essential distinction be-
tween the copies an author sells and the underlying intellectual property
communicated in the copy. 106 The separation of the intellectual property in
a record, book or movie from the ultimate movable product is consistent
with the treatment of packaged software as a good. Furthermore, the parties'
treatment of packaged software affects the characterization of the software
as either goods or services. 0 7 In the microcomputer industry, software
vendors generally mass-distribute prepackaged software over the counter with
no modifications or further services involved. 108 In Triangle, the Second
Circuit found the parties' contemplation of delivery of a completed system
with few services afterwards critical to the characterization of the system as
goods.'09 Packaged software, therefore, probably constitutes a good within
the scope of the UCC.
Although courts are likely to treat packaged software as a good, the
licensing of software may not constitute a sales transaction governed by
Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1460, 1464 (1983)
(UCC governs contract for printed magazines); Goshen Litho, Inc. v. Kohls, 582 F. Supp. 1561,
1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (contract for printed magazines is within UCC); Carpel v. Saget Studios,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (contract for photography is contract for sale of
goods within UCC).
105. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 71 (programmer's ideas become embodied in tape and
can become goods for sale).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982); see Nika Corp. v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 582 F. Supp.
343, 367 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (under Copyright Act, ownership of physical object embodying
copywritten work is distinct from ownership of copyright); Brooks, supra note 2, at 71
(distinguishing ownership of intellectual property from ownership of copy of work). A copyright
owner can transfer ownership of a physical copy of his creation without transferring ownership
of his copyright. Nika, 582 F. Supp. at 367.
107. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 72 (UCC recognizes parties' treatment of subject of
contract as relevant to characterization of goods). If the parties treat the subject of a sales
contract as a good, the UCC will recognize the product as a good. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1)
(1978). For example, the UCC recognizes that money, which is excluded from the definition of
goods, is a good when the parties to the transaction treat it as a commodity. Id. § 2-105,
comment I.
108. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing method of distributing software
in mocrocomputer industry). Although a user must buy software that is compatible with his
computer, the competitive software market generally allows a user to choose between several
comparable software products. In Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, the Illinois Appellate
Court concluded that the subject of a magazine printing contract was tangible printed magazines
and not printing services because the buyer had shopped for printers based on the lowest price
estimate. 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1460, 1463 (1983). The Clarke court also relied
on the fact that printing services were largely interchangeable and merely incidental to delivery
of the final product. Id. at 1464. The Clarke court, therefore, concluded that the contract for
printed magazines was a contract for goods governed by the UCC. Id. By analogy, prepackaged
software products should constitute goods within the meaning of the UCC because the user
shops for the end product and chooses between comparable software products.
109. 604 F.2d at 743.
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Article 2 of the UCC. Article 2 generally applies only to sales of goods."10
Under UCC section 2-106, a sale involves the passing of title for a price."'
Through the shrink-wrap license agreement, the software developer does not
sell the software outright, but rather retains title and grants a restrictive
license to use the software." 2 The licensing of programs in shrink-wrapped
packages, however, may be an outright sale and not a true license arrange-
ment." 3 If the real economic effect of a transaction is a direct sale, courts
often will treat the transaction as a sale and apply the UCC, despite what
the transaction purports to be." 4 For example, when a party has an option
to purchase a leased product at a nominal price at the end of the lease term
and the lease term extends over the entire useful life of the product, courts
110. See Manes Org. v. Standard Dyeing & Finishing Co., 472 F. Supp. 687, 690 n3.
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Article 2 of UCC governs transactions in goods in sale context); Computer
Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655 (D.S.C. 1970) (Article 2 of UCC
concerns contract for sale), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971); cf. William B. Tanner, Co.,
Inc. v. Wioo, Inc., 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALTAGHAN) 106, 112 n.5 (1975) (contract for
advertising services is not transaction in goods within meaning of Article 2 of UCC); see also
Brooks, supra note 2, at 74 (most of Article 2 of UCC expressly addresses sales); First Sale,
supra note 9, at 19 (Article 2 deals principally with sales).
111. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978).
112. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing use of license agreements to
retain proprietary rights in software).
113. See Immel, supra note 76, at 52 (noting that it is questionable whether shrink-wrap
license is in fact license); First Sale, supra note 9, at 20 (concluding that transfer pursuant to
shrink-wrap license constitutes sale under UCC).
114. See Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1297 (5th Cir. 1980)
(lease of computer system constituted sale); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Priority Elec.
Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that lease actually constitued conditional
sale); cf. 1 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES § 2.2, at 18 (4th ed. 1973) (courts
will look at intent of parties, substance rather than form, and spirit rather than letter of
transaction in determining true nature of transaction). In Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Burroughs
Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the real economic
effect of a transaction involving the lease of a computer system was a direct sale rather than a
financing arrangement for a true lease. 625 F.2d at 1297. The court, therefore, treated the
transaction as a sale. Id.
Similarly, in Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., the Georgia Court of Appeals considered
whether Article 2 of the UCC applied to transactions that are analogous to sales, although
denominated as nonsale transactions. 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 82, 88 (1975). In
Redfern, the plaintiff, Redfern Meats, Inc. (Redfern) had entered into a lease agreement with
Hertz Corp. (Hertz) for the rental of several tractors and trailers. Id. at 84. Redfern subsequently
brought suit against Hertz for breach of warranties. Id. Although the lease agreement disclaimed
Hertz' express warranties, the clause did not adequately disclaim implied warranties. Id. at 86.
The Redfern court, therefore, analyzed the transaction to determine whether the implied
warranties of the UCC applied. Id. The court adopted the approach that the warranty provisions
of the UCC apply to chattel leases when the transactions are analogous to sales. Id. at 89. The
Redfern court reasoned that merchants should not be able to avoid UCC obligations and deprive
consumers of UCC protections by selling goods under the guise of a lease. Id. at 91. The court
noted that courts will look to the purpose of a contract rather than the name the parties give
the contract to determine the real character of the contract. Id. The Redfern court concluded
that, although the transaction at issue was not a sale, the transaction was analogous to a sale
and the implied wawranties under the UCC were applicable. Id. at 93.
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often treat the lease as the substantial equivalent of a sale."15 Although under
a shrink-wrap license the software proprietor retains title to the intellectual
property, the software user pays one royalty fee for the licensed software
and the license lasts for the life of the product." 6 Furthermore, most shrink-
wrap licensors do not retain title to the particular copy of the program even
when the licensors expressly retain title to the intellectual property recorded
on the copy." 7 Many license agreements are ambiguous in their terms,
referring both to a "license" and a "sale" or "purchase" of the software.
Courts generally will construe such ambiguities against the drafter of the
agreement and, therefore, likely will categorize these software transactions
as sales." 8
Although no court has determined whether a first sale occurs under a
shrink-wrap license, courts have analyzed license agreements in other indus-
tries to determine whether a first sale has occurred."19 For example, courts
have held that a transfer of possession of a film print without a time
limitation, in conjunction with the payment of consideration and a failure
to expressly retain title constitutes a first sale. 20 Additionally, courts have
115. See National Equip. Rental v. Priority Elec. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236, 238-39 (E.D.N.Y
1977) (in determining whether agreement is lease or sale, courts compare purchase option price
to total rentals, total rental paymetns to selling price, and purchase option to fair market value);
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
252, 259 (1976) (relying on fact that total rental payments exceeded value of equipment in
concluding that leases actually were conditional sales); Brooks, supra note 2, at 75 (determination
of whether transaction is economic equivalent of sale depends on whether lease includes option
to purchase at nominal price at end of lease term, long lease term lasting for useful life of
property, and renewal options extending over useful life of property).
116. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 76 (software licenses usually have initial term for entire
useful life of software, have one time fees, and charge added fees for updates); First Sale, supra
note 9, at 18-19 (for one-time fees users receive licenses to use programs as many times and
over as many years as the users like).
117. See First Sale, supra note 9, at 19 (shrink-wrap licenses sometimes reserve title to
programs, but generally do not mention title to copies); Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app.
(sample license agreements).
118. See First Sale, supra note 9, at 20, 22 (interpretive maxims construe ambiguities
against drafter).
119. See United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1977) (considering whether
licensing of films constituted first sales); United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir.
1977) (analyzing license agreements to determine whether motion picture films had been subject
of first sale), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978); U.S. v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.)
(analyzing license agreements to determine whether agreements constituted first sales of motion
picture films), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d
510, 516 (3d Cir. 1961) (considering whether sale of comics for waste paper purposes only
resulted in first sale); Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1960)
(considering whether license for film amounted to assignment). Both a "sale" under the UCC
and a "first sale" under § 109 of the Copyright Act rely on the transfer of title, so the concepts
are analogous. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (first sale doctrine requires transfer of
title); U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978) (sale consists in passing of title from seller to buyer for price).
120. See U.S. v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1977) (consideration for transfer
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found that payment for the cost of a print or receipt of a just reward for
the use of an object is particularly indicative of a first sale. 12 1 The software
proprietor receives a royalty fee for the licensed software that constitutes a
just reward for the lifetime use of the software, so that a first sale of the
copy probably has occurred. 2 The user arguably is purchasing the particular
copy of the program but not the intellectual property in the copy.123 The
shrink-wrap licensing of software, therefore, probably constitutes a sale
within the UCC. Even if the licensing of software does not constitute a sale
within the UCC, the UCC should apply by analogy. For example, some
courts have applied Article 2 to analogous commercial transactions even in
the clear absence of a sales transaction.
24
In analyzing the validity of shrink-wrap licenses, courts should apply the
UCC. Many of the shrink-wrap licenses that software proprietors presently
use probably do not become part of the sales contract binding on the user
under UCC principles and supplementary contract law. 25 UCC section 2-204
provides that parties to a contract for the sale of goods may form the
contract in any manner showing agreement, including conduct. 26 The parties
do not form a contract under section 2-204, however, unless their conduct
of copy, Surrender of possession of copy, and failure to specifically retain title together constitute
first sale); see also 2 M. NIMMER, NIMaER ON COPYRIGHT (Bender) § 8.12[B][1], at 8-121 (1984
ed.) (courts have held that transfer of possession of film print without time limitation constitues
first sale if accompanied by payment of consideration and failure to expressly retain title).
121. See U.S. v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir.) (payment for cost of film when
agreement fails to expressly reserve title reveals sale transaction), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929
(1977); Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1963) (transfer
equals first sale if proprietor has received just reward for use of product); see generally M.
NIMMER, supra note 120, § 8.12lA] (discussing policy behind distribution right).
122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (user pays one royalty fee for use of
software); see generally Software Royalties, supra note 60 (discussing royalties in software
industry).
123. See First Sale, supra note 9, Lt 22 (concluding that users have purchased copies of
programs through shrink-wrap licenses).
124. See William B. Tanner Co., Inc. v. Mesa Broadcasting Co., 575 F. Supp. 1501, 1502
(D. Colo. 1983) (applying UCC provisions to contract for advertising services although trans-
action was not sale of goods); Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F, slip op.
at _ (D. Mass. 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file) (UCC's provisions are
helpful and persuasive by analogy in contract cases when UCC does not control); Wivagg v.
Duquesne Light Co., 20 U.C.C. REP. SERv. (CALLArHAN) 597, 601 (1975) (acknowledging that
courts can imply warranties in nonsales transactions by analogy to UCC). But see William B.
Tanner, Co., Inc., v. Wioo, Inc., 18 U.C.C. REP. SERv. (CALsAaI") 106, 112 n.5 (1975)
(UCC does not govern contract for advertsing services that is not transaction in goods within
Article 2 of UCC).
125. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (principles of law and equity supplement UCC).
126. Id. § 2-204(1). See Manes Org. v. Standard Dyeing & Finishing Co.,- 472 F. Supp.
687, 690 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (offeror may suggest and authorize acceptance in one or more
particular modes) (quoting I A. CoIaN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 77, at 329 (1963)). The
comment to UCC § 2-204 states that appropriate conduct may be sufficient to establish an
agreement even in the absence of an express verbal understanding. U.C.C. § 2-204(1), comment
(1978); see Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D. Conn. 1980)
(any words or acts that indicate assent may constitute acceptance).
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shows a mutual manifestation of assent.' 27 Two essential elements of a
binding contract are consideration and mutuality of agreement. 28 An offer
and acceptance indicate that parties have reached an agreement and formed
a contract.' 29 A basic tenet of contract law is that the offeror is the master
of his offer and he may stipulate any conditions or terms as prerequisites to
the creation of a contract, including the method of acceptance. 30 Unless the
offeror clearly specifies the manner of acceptance, however, courts will
construe an offer as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium
reasonable under the circumstances.' 3' Shrink-wrap licenses provide that the
user's act of tearing open the shrink-wrap package containing the software
constitutes acceptance of the terms of the license agreement.'3 2 The user's
act of opening the package, however, may not constitute a sufficient mani-
festation of assent to the shrink-wrap license agreement.," The shrink-wrap
license agreement, therefore, may not become part of the contract binding
on the user.
When the user has an opportunity to read the license agreement before
purchasing the software, the shrink-wrap license terms probably are binding
127. See Slocomb Indus., Inc. v. Chelsea Indus., 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
1543, 1546 (1983) (conduct must show mutual manifestation of assent to form contract under
UCC § 2-204); Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1976)
(conduct established mutuality of assent to contracts), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1979).
128. See Interstate Indus., Inc. v. Barclay Indus., Inc., 540 F.2d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 1976)
(agreement or meeting of minds is necessary to form contract); Textron, Inc. v. Teleoperator
Sys. Corp., 554 F. Supp. 315, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no mutually agreed upon
arrangement with respect to rights to technology developed prior to project); Kansas Power &
Light Co. v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1336, 1347 (D. Kan. 1982) (in order for
parties to form binding contract, there must be meeting of minds), rev'd, 740 F.2d 780 (10th
Cir. 1984); Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v. Medical Serv. Ass'n of Pa., 474 F. Supp. 472,
477 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (consideration is essential ingredient of contract), modified, 628 F.2d 820
(3d Cir. 1980). Although there is no privity of contract between the software proprietor and
the user, the software proprietor receives part of the royalty fee that the user pays to the
distributor. See Software Royalties, supra note 60, at 393 (discussing mass distribution of
software in mocrocomputer market); supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing
distribution of software in mocrocomputer market).
129. See W. HAVCLAND, 2 HAwKLAND U.C.C. SERIES (CALLAGHAN) (1982) § 2-206:02, at
87 (offer and acceptance are relevant in determining whether parties reached agreement).
130. See Great W. Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut Co., 567 F. Supp. 340, 343 (N.D. Tex.)
(offeror is master of his offer and may require conditions or terms as prerequisite to formation
of contract), aff'd, 721 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1983); 1 A. CoRnN, CORBIn ON CONTRACTS § 94, at
389 (1963) (offeror has control of terms of offer and mode of acceptance); W. HAWKLAND,
supra note 129, § 2-206:02, at 88 (offeror can require any act or promise as means of acceptance).
131. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1978). Comment I to UCC § 2-206 provides that any reasonable
manner of acceptance is available unless the offeror has made clear that a particular mode will
not be acceptable. Id. comment 1.
132. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); appendix
attached (IBM shrink-wrap license).
133. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 549 (doubting whether opening software package
coupled with notice meets criteria for acceptance of license contract); see also infra notes 134-
164 and accompanying text (analysis of validity of shrink-wrap license).
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on the user. The software vendor's offer conditions acceptance of the
software on acceptance of the terms of the license. 3 4 The visible shrink-wrap
license expressly states that the user's act of opening the package indicates
the user's acceptance of the terms and conditions of the license agreement. 3 '
Until the user opens the shrink-wrap package, the user may reject the offer
for sale and return the software package unopened for a refund of the
purchase price. 36 Courts consistently have concluded that contracts in anal-
ogous situations are binding on the parties. 37 For example, courts have held
that a tag attached to a bag of seeds, a notice printed on a film package,
and a label on a can of herbicide, each of which contained the conditions
of sale, became part of the sale contracts and were binding on the parties.'
Similarly, a license agreement containing the conditions of sale and printed
on the shrink-wrapped package becomes part of the sales contract and is
binding on the parties.
When the user does not have an opportunity to read the license agreement
before purchasing the software, however, the validity of the shrink-wrap
license is more questionable. The software vendor's failure to provide the
buyer with access to the license agreement before purchase is an attempt to
impose the terms of the license on the user after the sale. The contract of
sale is complete and binding when the user pays for and takes possession of
the software package. 3 9 The user indicates acceptance of the offer to sell by
134. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements). Courts have
held that language contained on a product tag or label inviting the buyer to return the product
unopened for a refund if he does not accept the terms, makes acceptance of the product
conditinal on acceptance of the terms. See Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 35 U.C.C. REP.
SERv. (CALLAGHAN) 91, 97 (1982) (provision on label inviting buyer to repudiate if unwilling to
accept terms makes terms express condition of sale); Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 629, 636 (1972) (language on tag attached to seed bag expressly made
acceptance of seed conditional on acceptance of disclaimer of warranty provisions).
135. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); attached
appendix (IBM shrink-wrap license).
136. See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406 app. (sample license agreements); attached
appendix (IBM shrink-wrap license).
137. See infra note 138 (discussing cases upholding terms and conditions of sale printed
on product tags and labels).
138. See Monsanto Agricultural Products Co. v. Edenfield, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CAL-
LAGHAN) 781, 786-87 (1983) (limitation of warranty and liability printed on label of herbicide
can and on face of instruction booklet affixed to top of can became part of bargain); Hill v.
BASF Wyandotte Corp., 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAoAN) 91, 97 (1982) (conditions of sale
printed on label of herbicide can were valid); Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. RaP.
SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 629, 643 (1972) (courts long have recognized warranty disclaimers on tags
attached to seed bags as part of sales contract); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 10 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 53, 56-57 (1972) (holding that disclaimer of warranty
and limitation of remedy printed on Kodak film packages were valid and enforceable). The
buyer cannot vary the terms and conditions of the sale contained on the product label, which
exclusively control the legal relations of the parties. See Hill, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
at 96.
139. See Gillispie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 10 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHIAN) 754,
757 (1972) (sale is consummated when seller completes delivery); see also U.C.C. § 2-401(2)
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accepting possession and paying for the software. 40 The additional terms
contained in the license agreement, therefore, constitute an attempt by the
software developer to modify the original contract terms after the sale.'
4'
Although UCC section 2-209 does not require new consideration to modify
the terms of a contract, mutual assent is necessary to subsequently modify
the contract terms.' 42 The courts consistently have refused to enforce post-
contract, unilateral modifications of contract terms. 43 The shrink-wrap
license, however, does provide the user with an opportunity to read and
reject the additional terms contained in the software package before the user
opens the separate diskette package. Opening the separate diskette package
and using the software, therefore, may constitute the user's acceptance of
the modified terms. Whether the user's act of opening the separate diskette
package binds him to the modified contract terms, however, is questionable.
Courts that have considered the modification of contracts in similar contexts
generally have refused to allow the modifications." For example, courts
have declined to construe the buyer's use of a product after purchase as
assent to subsequent modification of the terms of the sale. 45
In Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 46 the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota considered whether a seller's post contract,
(1978) (unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to buyer when seller completes physical
delivery of goods).
140. See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALAGHAN) 75, 83 (1983) (plaintiff accepted counter-offer by
conduct manifested through acceptance, payment for and use of product).
141. See U.C.C. § 2-209(l) (1978) (agreement modifying contract within Article 2 needs
no consideration to be binding).
142. U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978). See Cambern v. Hubbling, 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
653, 655-56 (1976) (although parties expressly may modify contract without new consideration,
parties in fact must make agreement to modify terms). Under UCC § 2-209, contract modifi-
cations must meet the test of good faith, which may require a demonstrable reason for seeking
the modification. U.C.C. § 2-209, comment 2 (1978).
143. See Pennington Grain & Seed, Inc. v. Tuten, 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
458, 462 (1982) (warranty disclaimer printed on tag attached to bag of seed after purchase was
ineffective because it was post-contractual, unbargained for, unilateral attempt to limit obliga-
tions under contract); Taterka v. Ford Motor Co., 25 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 680,
685-86 (1978) (disclaimer of warranty given to purchaser subsequent to sales transaction was
ineffective); Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., Inc., 15 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
78, 83 (1974) (refusing to enforce manufacturer's warranty disclaimer delivered after completion
of sales contract); Woodward v. Naylor Motor Sales, 14 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1269,
1273-74 (1974) (when seller gives disclaimer only subsequent to sale upon delivery of product,
such disclaimer is ineffective to modify warranty).
144. See supra note 143 (discussing cases refusing to enforce subsequent unilateral modi-
fications of contract terms).
145. See Woodward v. Naylor Motor Sales, 14 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALHAN) 1269,
1274 (1974) (acceptance and use of automobile did not indicate express acceptance of modified
terms).
146. 551 F. Supp. 771 (D.S.D. 1982). In Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., Horizons, Inc.
(Horizons) ordered an engine remanufactured by Avco Corp. (Avco), a manufacturer of engines
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unilateral modification of contract terms was binding on the buyer. 47 In
Horizons, Avco Corporation (Avco), a seller of aircraft engines, unilaterally
injected a limited standard warranty into a sales transaction after the purchase
agreement was binding on Horizons, Inc. (Horizons), the buyer.' 4 Since
Avco had not disclosed the terms of the warranty to Horizons prior to the
purchase agreement, and because the parties had not bargained for the
additional terms as part of the contract, the South Dakota district court
found that the limited warranty was not a part of the bargain. 49 The
Horizons court concluded that a warranty limitation and disclaimer stated
in printed matter given to the buyer only after the sale is not binding.'50 The
Horizons court further concluded that Horizons' return of the warranty
registration card standing alone could not constitute a modification of the
contract.15 The court refused to find that Horizons' conduct constituted an
indication of Horizons' assent to the terms of the limited warranty for which
the parties had not previously bargained. 5 2 In reaching its decision, however,
the Horizons court partially relied on the fact that the warranty registration
card was not in evidence to determine Horizons' understanding of the limited
warranty. 53 The Horizons court also relied on a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reaching the same result in a
similar case when the warranty registration card did not contain the warranty
disclaimer or incorporate the disclaimer by reference and did not include the
for utility aricraft, through a dealer. Id. at 773. When Horizons negotiated for the purchase of
the engine, the parties did not discuss the warranties covering the engine. Id. When Horizons
received the engine, however, Avco's limited standard warranty was included in a packet of
materials attached to the engine at the time of delivery. Id. A Horizons employee filled out and
mailed to Avco a warranty registration card which also was included in the packet. Id. at 773-
74. Later, when Horizons experienced a series of mechanical breakdowns in the engine, Horizons
sued Avco for breach of warranty in the United States District Court for the District of South
Dakota. Id. at 774. In response to Horizons' complaint, Avco alleged an absence of privity of
contract as a bar to the action. Id. at 777. The South Dakota district court, however, concluded
that actions against manufacturers based upon warranty theories were actionable in South
Dakota notwithstanding a lack of privity between the plaintiff and the manufacturer. Id. at
778. Avco also alleged that Avco's limited standard warranty excluded any liability for
consequential damages. Id. Horizons argued that the limited warranty had not become part of
the contract for the sale of the engine. Id. at 778-79.
147. Id. at 778.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 779. The Horizons court reasoned that the law does not favor warranty
disclaimers and exclusions, and that the parties to a contract must negotiate or bargain for such
terms in order to assure that the buyer is aware of the warranty limitations when the parties
make the contract. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Horizons court found that the Horizons' pilot who mailed the form to register
the warranty did not understand the meaning of the exclusion of consequential damages at the
time. Id. The court held, therefore, that the return of the registration form did not indicate
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buyer's signature. 5 4 The Horizons court's decision suggests that a user's
conduct in merely opening a diskette package and using the software probably
will not constitute assent to the modified contract terms of a shrink-wrap
license agreement because the user does not intend to indicate assent by his
ordinary actions.'
Similarly, in Woodward v. Naylor Motor Sales, 1'6 the Michigan District
Court for the Fifteenth Judicial District considered the effectiveness of
warranty disclaimers given subsequent to the time of a sale.157 In Woodward,
the plaintiff, Woodward, had contracted with the defendant, Naylor Motor
Sales (Naylor) for the sale of an automobile and had signed a purchase order
that referred to warranties in Naylor's New Car Guarantee. 5  Naylor later
had delivered the car along with a warranty booklet containing a disclaimer
of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. 59 The Michigan
district court refused to apply the doctrine of incorporation by reference to
incorporate the catalogue into the sales contract.1' ° The Woodward court
held that the reference in the sales contract to Naylor's New Car Guarantee
had not put the plaintiff on notice that the guarantee contained a disclaimer
of warranties and the court, therefore, concluded that the clause was an
insufficient disclaimer.' 6' The Woodward court further held that Naylor
could not disclaim the warranties after the creation of the contract unless
the plaintiff expressly had agreed to accept the disclaimer as a subsequent
modification of the contract. 62 The Woodward court concluded that the
plaintiff's acceptance and use of the automobile did not indicate an express
acceptance of the disclaimer because the buyer did not intend to give his
ordinary action such a meaning. 63
154. Id. See Van den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 576 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1978)
(unless disclaimers are disclosed and agreed upon prior to creation of contract, such disclaimers
are not binding). In Van den Broeke v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., the Fifth Circuit considered
whether the return of a warranty card could operate as a waiver of warranty rights. 576 F.2d
at 584. The Broeke court, however, found that the buyer did not intend to waive his rights by
mailing the warranty card and concluded, therefore, that no waiver had occurred. Id. The Fifth
Circuit held that a waiver must be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Id.
155. See supra notes 146-154 and accompanying text (discussing Horizons case). The
Horizons case suggests that unless the parties expressly agree to modify a contract, terms
injected after a sale will not be binding because they did not become part of the basis of the
bargain. See supra notes 146-154 and accompanying text (discussing Horizons case). The offeror
cannot give the meaning of assent to an ordinary act of the offeree when the offeree does not
intend to give his acts such a meaning. See 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 73, at 310
(1963) (offeror has no power to cause ordinary act of offeree to operate as acceptance when
offeree does not intend to give act such meaning).
156. 14 U.C.C. REP. SERv. (CALLAGHAN) 1269 (1974).
157. Id. at 1270, 1274.
158. Id. at 1270-71.
159. Id. at 1271.
160. Id. at 1272.
161. Id. at 1273-74.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1274.
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Applying the principles of the Horizons and Woodward decisions to the
context of shrink-wrapped software sales, a user's opening of the separate
diskette package and use of the sofware is unlikely to indicate the user's
acceptance of the modified terms in the shrink-wrap license agreement
because the user usually does not intend to accept the modified terms by his
ordinary act of using the software.' 64 When the software vendor does not
package the software so that the license agreement is visible and readable
before purchase, therefore, the terms of the license probably do not become
part of the sales contract binding on the user.
UCC section 2-513 provides that the buyer has a right to inspect goods
identified to a sales contract before payment or acceptance, unless the parties
agree otherwise. 6 Under the provisions of the standard shrink-wrap license
agreement, however, the user does not have an opportunity to inspect the
software. The standard shrink-wrap license provides that the user may not
return the software for a refund after opening the package, leaving the user
with no opportunity to test the computer program. 66 Prepackaged application
software, however, is standard in form and every user receives exactly the
same program. 67 The user generally is able to see the software in operation
at the computer store and, therefore, has an opportunity to inspect an exact
copy of the software he purchases. 68 The user still retains the right to revoke
acceptance if his copy of the software is substantially impaired. 69 Thus,
although a user essentially waives his right to inspect his copy of the software
under a shrink-wrap license agreement, the user still retains adequate assur-
ance that he receives conforming goods.
Even if the shrink-wrap license becomes part of the sales contract, certain
terms may not be effective. There is some question whether the Copyright
Act preempts state law contract actions for the protection of intellectual
164. See supra notes 146-63 and accompanying text (discussing Horizons and Woodward
cases).
165. U.C.C. § 2-513 (1978) (unless otherwise agreed, buyer has right to inspect goods in
any reasonable manner before payment or acceptance). See Laurie, supra note 63, at 393-406
app. (sample license agreement); attached appendix (standard shrink-wrap license). The standard
shrink-wrap license provides for acceptance by opening the software package, therefore pre-
cluding the buyer from testing the software before accepting the license terms. See attached
appendix (standard shrink-wrap license).
166. See attached appendix (standard shrink-wrap license).
167. See P. HoFFMAN, supra note 1, at 3.1-1 (users have identical copies of program when
software is standard).
168. See id. (users are able to see software in operation at user sites).
169. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (1978) (buyer may revoke acceptance when nonconformity of
goods substantially impairs value to buyer). Section 2-608(1) of the UCC makes the buyer's
right to revoke acceptance conditional. Id. § 2-608(1) (1978). The buyer must have accepted due
to his reliance that the seller would cure the nonconformity, the difficulty of discovering the
nonconformity, or the seller's assurances. Id. Furthermore, under the UCC the buyer must
revoke acceptance within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered the
nonconformity and before any substantial change occurs in the condition of the goods. Id. §
2-608(2).
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property.1 70 Section 301 of the Copyright Act, however, preempts only those
state laws which create rights that are equivalent to the exclusive rights
created by section 106 of the Copyright Act.' 7' If other elements in addition
to the elements of a copyright claim are necessary to constitute the sate cause
of action, then the state right is not equivalent to the federal rights under
the Copyright Act and the Copyright Act does not preempt the right under
state law. 72 The preemption question with respect to shrink-wrap license
agreements, therefore, depends on whether the contractual limitations are
merely the equivalent of copyright protection or contain elements different
from copyright infringement.
Sections 109 and 117 of the Copyright Act, which limit the section 106
exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner, grant the owner of a particular
copy the rights to transfer that copy and to make a copy for backup
purposes.' 71 Shrink-wrap license provisions restricting the user's rights to
transfer and copy, therefore, conflict with the rights granted to the user
under sections 109 and 117.174 Legislative history and case law, however,
suggest that such contractual provisions are valid and that the Copyright Act
does not preempt breach of contract actions. 7  The legislative history of
section 301 specifically states that nothing in the bill interferes with the rights
of parties to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract.
7 6
Furthermore, the legislative history of section 109 states that although a
violation of conditions imposed by contract on the future disposition of
copies does not constitute copyright infringement, such a violation may
constitute a breach of contract.'7 7 Similarly, several courts have held that
170. See 2 M. NIMUMER, NIIAAR ON COPYRiGHT (Bender) § 16.04[C], at 16-24 (1984)
(question arises whether Copyright Act preempts state law contract action for protection of
idea).
171. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301, 106 (1982). The exclusive rights under section 106 of the Copyright
Act include the rights of reproduction, distribution, preparation of derivative works, and public
performance and display. Id. § 106.
172. See 1 M. NIMMER, NMMER ON CoPYRiorr (Bender) § 1.01[BI[I], at 1-12 (1984) (if
state cause of action requires other element in addition to exclusive rights, right is not within
general scope of copyright and there is no preemption). The purpose of § 301 of the Copyright
Act was to adopt a uniform national copyright system and to preempt state common law of
copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659 (discussing arguments for single federal system of copyright).
173. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (1982).
174. Id.
175. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Copy-
right Act and case law).
176. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONo. & AD. NEws 5659 (nothing in bill interferes with rights of parties to contract with each
other); H.R. REP. No. 781 (Committee on Judiciary), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.53, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5750 (other examples of non-equivalent, and hence
non-preempted, state rights would include breaches of contract).
177. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659 (although parties cannot enforce contractual conditions on future disposition
of copies by action for copyright infringement, conditions are enforceable as breach of contract).
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even though an owner of a copy does not infringe the copyright by transfer-
ring the copy in breach of an agreement restricting rights to transfer, the
owner of the copy may be liable for breach of contract. 78 An action for
breach of contract does not provide rights equivalent to copyright because
the plaintiff must allege another element, a promise, in addition to the
violation of any of the exclusive rights. 79 Legislative history and case law,
therefore, suggest that contractual restrictions on transfer and copying for
backup purposes are effective. 80
In addition to possible preemption problems, certain provisions in shrink-
wrap licenses may be unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. Section
2-302 of the UCC allows a court to refuse to enforce contracts or clauses
that were unconscionable at the time the parties entered into the contract.' 8'
Although courts will apply the unconscionability doctrine to prevent oppres-
sion and unfair surprise, courts will not invoke the doctrine to relieve a party
from a bad bargain.s 2 Courts have found unconscionability when a one-
sided agreement deprives a party of all the benefits of the agreement or
precludes any remedy for breach, or when the terms bear no reasonable
relationship to business risks. 3 Courts, however, generally uphold limitations
of liability that are reasonable and allow parties to allocate risks in a
178. See American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 and n.3 (5th Cir.
1978) (after first sale, buyer is not liable for copyright infringement but may be liable for breach
of contract); United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1977) (once first sale
occurs, copyright holder has only civil remedies against vendee who violated contractual
restrictions on transfer); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 n.10 (9th Cir.) (where first
sale has occurred, licensee may be liable for breach of contract but is not guilty of copyright
infringement), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977); Independent News Co. v. Williams 293 F.2d
510, 516 (3d Cir. 1961) (buyer who acquired title to copy may be liable for violation of
agreement but is not guilty of copyright infringement).
179. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT (Bender) § 1.01[B][1], at 1-13 (1984) (breach
of contract is not right equivalent to copyright because action involves additional element of
promise to pay).
180. See supra note 170-79 and accompanying text (discussing whether Copyright Act
preempts action for breach of license agreement).
181. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (court may refuse to enforce contract that court finds to
have been unconscionable at time parties entered contract, or court may limit application of
any unconscionable clause to avoid unconscionable result). But see Earman Oil Co., Inc. v.
Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to find exculpatory provisions
in contract unconscionable). An unconscionable contract is one that no reasonable man would
make and no honest and fair man would accept. York v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1265, 1278 (N.D. Miss. 1984). There are two types of unconscionability, procedural uncons-
cionability and substantive unconscionability. Id. The test of unconscionability is whether, in
light of the commercial background and needs of the particular trade or case, the clause or
contract is so one-sided that it is unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time
the parties made the contract. See York, 585 F. Supp. at 1278; see also U.C.C. § 2-302,
comment 1 (1978).
182. See U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (1978) (principle of unconscionability is one of
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise); Bank of Indiana, N.A. v. Holyfield, 476 F.
Supp. 104, 109 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (doctrine of unconscionability was intended to prevent
oppression and unfair surprise, and not to relieve party from bad bargain).
183. See Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1975)
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contract. 8 4 Furthermore, courts have upheld provisions in license agreements
restricting the user's rights. 85 Because courts have upheld license restrictions
and limitations of liability in similar situations, courts probably will uphold
the provisions of shrink-wrap licenses if the shrink-wrap license becomes
part of the sales contract. 6
Many of the shrink-wrap license agreements that software proprietors
presently use to market their software products probably do not become part
of the sales contract binding on the user because the software vendor
unilaterally imposes the terms of the license on the user after the sale is
complete.8 7 When the software proprietor packages the software with a
license agreement on the back of the package, visible through the cellophane
wrapping, however, the shrink-wrap license likely becomes part of the
conditions and terms governing the sales contract.' When the license
agreement is accessible to the buyer before purchase the user knows exactly
what he is purchasing at the time of the sale and may either reject the
bargain or accept the software subject to the terms of the offer. 8 9 Reliance
on the use of license agreements in addition to copyright protection enables
the software proprietor to control the use of his product and gain greater
protection than he could obtain through the use of traditional methods of
(provisions that bear no reasonable relationship to business risks are unconscionable); Bank of
Indiana, N.A. v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 110 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (unconscionability is
present when one-sided agreement deprives one party of all benefits of agreement or precludes
remedy for breach).
184. See Allen v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 154, 159 (E.D. Mo.
1984) (voluntary shift of liability does not violate public policy provided such shift is reasonable,
is negotiated freely and does not absolve liability for party's sole negligence); D'Antuono v.
CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 713 (D.R.I. 1983) (parties to contract can
negotiate rights freely); Can-Key Indus., Inc. v. Industrial Leasing Corp., 26 U.C.C. RaP.
SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 53, 57 (1972) (if limitation of liability is reasonable courts should uphold
limitation); W. HAwVKL~AD, supra note 129, § 2-302:01, at 156-57 (unconscionability doctrine
is exception to freedom of contract and gives courts power to modify contract where free choice
is absent). Courts exercise caution in analyzing printed form contracts. See D'Antuono v. CCH
Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 714 (D.R.I. 1983) (boilerplate contracts should alert
courts); Bank of Indiana, N.A. v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 111 (S.D. Miss. 1979)
(considering factor that lease was printed form contract in finding terms of lease unconsciona-
ble).
185. See supra notes 12 & 54 and accompanying text (discussing general acceptance of
courts of license agreements as legally effective means of protecting proprietors' rights).
186. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (discussing unconscionability doctrine).
Courts tend to uphold provisions allocating risks when the price of a product reflects such
allocation. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 10 U.C.C. RaP. SERv.
(CALAOAN) 53, 56-57 (1972) (upholding limitations on liability that enabled company to
reasonably price sale of film); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 715
(D.R.I. 1983) (noting that provision was factored into price and terms of agreement).
187. See supra notes 139-164 and accompanying text (discussing validity of shrink-wrap
license agreements).
188. See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text (validity of shrink-wrap license
agreements analyzed).
189. See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text (analyzing validity of shrink-wrap
license agreements).
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legal protection alone. 90 Upholding the validity of license agreements when
the user has an opportunity to read the agreement before purchasing the
software, therefore, properly balances the software proprietor's interest in
protecting his intellectual property rights in software with the user's right to
get what he bargains for.'9' Providing the software proprietor with adequate
means of protecting his interests in software will encourage the innovative
development of software and promote wide distribution. 192 If the software
proprietor packages the software carefully, therefore, he can use a shrink-
wrap license effectively in conjunction with copyright law to protect fully
the proprietary interests in his software.
Karen Puhala
190. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (discussing protection afforded by use
of license restrictions).
191. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing need to balance competing
interests).
192. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing need for methods to protect
software).
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APPENDIX
International Business Boca Raton, Florida 33432
Machines Corporation
IBM PROGRAM LICENSE AGREEMENT
YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY READ THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND
CONDITIONS BEFORE OPENING THIS DISKETTE(S) OR CAS-
SETTE(S) PACKAGE. OPENING THIS DISKETTE(S) OR CASSETTE(S)
PACKAGE INDICATES YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THESE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THEM, YOU SHOULD
PROMPTLY RETURN THE PACKAGE UNOPENED; AND YOUR
MONEY WILL BE REFUNDED.
IBM provides this program and licenses its use in the United States and
Puerto Rico. You assume responsibility for the selection of the program to
achieve your intended results, and for the installation, use and results
obtained from the program.
LICENSE
You may:
a. use the program on a single machine;
b. copy the program into any machine readable or printed form for
backup or modification purposes in support of your use of the
program on the single machine (Certain programs, however, may
include mechanisms to limit or inhibit copying. They are marked
''copy protected.");
c. modify the program and/or merge it into another program for
your use on the single machine (Any portion of this program
merged into another program will continue to be subject to the
terms and conditions of this Agreement.); and,
d. transfer the program and license to another party if the other
party agrees to accept the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
If you transfer the program, you must at the same time either
transfer all copies whether in printed or machine-readable form
to the same party or destroy any copies not transferred; this
includes all modifications and portions of the program contained
or merged into other programs.
You must reproduce and include the copyright notice on any copy, modifi-
cation or portion merged into another program.
YOU MAY NOT USE, COPY, MODIFY, OR TRANSFER THE PRO-
GRAM, OR ANY COPY, MODIFICATION OR MERGED PORTION, IN
WHOLE OR IN PART, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN
THIS LICENSE.
19851
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IF YOU TRANSFER POSSESSION OF ANY COPY, MODIFICATION
OR MERGED PORTION OF THE PROGRAM TO ANOTHER PARTY,
YOUR LICENSE IS AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED.
TERM
The license is effective until terminated. You may terminate it at any other
time by destroying the program together with all copies, modifications and
merged portions in any form. It will also terminate upon conditions set forth
elsewhere in this Agreement or if you fail to comply with any term or
condition of this Agreement. You agree upon such termination to destroy
the program together with all copies, modiciations and merged portions in
any form.
LIMITED WARRANTY
THE PROGRAM IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF
ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTA-
BILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE
RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PRO-
GRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE,
YOU (AND NOT IBM OR AN AUTHORIZED PERSONAL COMPUTER
DEALER) ASSUME THE ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERV-
ICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
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